1. For an overview of the historical development of auteurism, and an interesting albeit narrow sample of theoretical responses to the problems of cinematic authorship, see the essays collected in John Caughie (ed.), Theories of Authorship: A Reader (London: Routledge, 1990).
2. Elsewhere I have argued at length that a great many movies most certainly have makers, that is, individuals who deliberately exercise decisive control over a film's meaning, form, and illocutionary force. See my What Is Non-Fiction Cinema? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). A further intuition is that many, but certainly not all, cinematic works have a special kind of maker, an author. Readers wanting intelligent introductions to the debates and hypothesis to which I can only now allude could not do better than to consult these two essays: Paisley Livingston, "Cinematic Authorship," in Richard Allen and Murray Smith (eds.), Film Theory and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 132-48; Berys Gaut, "Film Authorship and Collaboration," in Allen and Smith (eds.), 148-72. Gaut's essay is, it should be noted, a thoroughgoing critique of several versions of auteurism which is also sensitive to the artistic contributions of individual agents.
3. Andrew Sarris, "Towards a Theory of Film History," in Bill Nichols (ed.), Movies and Methods (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 247; Alexandre Astruc, "The Birth of a New Avant-Garde: La Caméra-Stylo," in Peter Graham (ed.), The New Wave (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), 23.
4. Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Mele's book is an excellent introduction to philosophical debates concerning autonomy, not the least of its virtues being its clear accounts of the key theses--compatibilism, incompatibilism, libertarianism, determinism, and indeterminism--pertaining to the nature and limits to the possibility of human autonomy. The philosophical literature on autonomy is truly vast and often highly technical. Aside from Mele's work, I have found the following writings to be of use in gaining a foothold in the topic: Alfred J. Ayer, "Freedom and Necessity," in Ayer, Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1954); Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Harry G. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Robert Young, Personal Autonomy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).
7. Mele, Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Michael Bratman's Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1987) is another detailed and insightful examination on the complex topic of intentionality. I also recommend two articles co-authored by Mele and Livingston which cast particularly strong light on the relevance of intentionality to matters of literature, aesthetics, and symbolic communication; see Paisley Livingston and Alfred Mele, "Intention and Literature," Stanford French Review 16 (1992): 173-96 and Alfred Mele and Paisley Livingston, "Intentions and Interpretations," MLN 107 (1992): 931-49.
14. I see no reason why such deliberations can not include--as a source of ideas, a method of evaluation, and a means of trouble-shooting or testing--the activities and products associated with an author's daydreams and imagination. Indeed very many artistic projects result from makers' deliberations about what situations, events, stories, characters, and so forth they mean for their audience to imagine or make-believe.
18. Mele, Autonomous Agents, 117. Like Mele, one might add weight to this concept, and distinguish between important and trivial instances of identification, by saying that in core cases of identification, the agent forms a belief to the effect that his having a given value is a good thing, on balance or without qualification.