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Thomas Heyd and Ira Newman have given careful attention
to my position concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature. I greatly
appreciate their efforts. They have also raised a number of interesting
questions about that position and, more importantly, have outlined their
own alternative points of view on this issue. Since Heyd's and Newman's
positions are in themselves interesting and important and since I agree
with them in a number of ways, in these remarks I primarily consider
these alternative points of view, addressing some of the queries about
my own positions only as they arise in the course of the discussion.
To clearly state Heyd's and Newman's positions
concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature and to fruitfully contrast
them with my own, it is helpful to put in place a general schemata for
characterizing positions concerning the nature of aesthetic appreciation.
In doing so I make two assumptions, one methodological and the other
philosophical. The methodological assumption is simply that the various
positions I wish to clarify and contrast can be usefully and non-controversially
characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving
aesthetic appreciation. The philosophical assumption is that common
to all such sets of conditions for achieving aesthetic appreciation
will be a condition specifying some kind of attention, sensitivity,
attitude, taste, or the like. The exact nature of this condition, although
of considerable philosophical interest, need not concern us here, for
the important differences between my position and those of Heyd and
Newman do not depend upon this condition.[1]
Given these two assumptions, together with
the following abbreviations: AK for kind of attention, PK for kind of
properties, OK for kind of objects, AA for aesthetic appreciation, and
iff (if and only if) for necessary and sufficient for, a basic position
type may be characterized as follows:
1. BASIC TYPE: AK to PK iff
AA of OK.
This position type specifies
both the kind of properties toward which attention must be directed
and the kind of objects of which aesthetic appreciation is thus achieved.
However, it can be usefully modified by the introduction of the notion
of appropriate aesthetic appreciation (AAA) rather than simple aesthetic
appreciation, and then weakened such that it indicates only a necessary
condition. This gives two additional position types, which I label normative
and weak normative:
2. NORMATIVE: AK to PK iff
AAA of OK.
3. WEAK NORMATIVE: AK to PK
if AAA of OK.
The last, the weak normative position type,
is that in terms of which I wish to state and contrast the positions
under discussion here. However, before doing so, it is necessary to
consider some of Heyd's reservations about the notion just introduced,
that of appropriate aesthetic appreciation. Heyd comments as follows:
Carlson's proposal that there is such a thing
as 'correct' or 'appropriate' aesthetic appreciation should give us...cause
to wonder..., for we may ask, correctness and appropriateness according
to which standards or to what purpose? Even in the aesthetic appreciation
of artworks it remains uncertain what might make the appreciation of
a particular piece 'correct' or 'appropriate,' for otherwise there would
not be dissension among art critics and art historians. [2]
The answer to Heyd's question is implicit in
what has already been said. Given that aesthetic appreciation is tied
to particular kinds of objects, as in the basic position type indicated
above, it is both possible and useful to introduce a notion such as
correct or appropriate aesthetic appreciation, for relevant standards
or purposes, which Heyd worries are lacking, are in fact given by the
nature of the kind of object of appreciation in question. For example,
the nature of music is such that aesthetic appreciation is appropriate
only if it involves listening rather than just looking; and the nature
of a heavy metal music performance is such that appropriateness require
listening mainly to beat rather than to, say, pitch, and perhaps requires
a lot of looking (and other activity) as well as listening. [3] Heyd may doubt the relevance of correctness or appropriateness in
the appreciation of works of art, but his comment about dissension among
art critics and art historians undercuts rather than supports his doubt,
for were certain kinds of appreciation of different kinds of works not
more correct or appropriate than others, art critics and art historians
would have little to have dissension about. As always, if anything goes,
there is little to argue about.
I return to Heyd's own account of the aesthetic
appreciation of nature below. First, however, I wish to use the position
types indicated above to clearly state Newman's point of view. Newman
is concerned about my treatment of formalism in the appreciation of
nature. He provides an excellent discussion of classic formalism concerning
the appreciation of art and then elaborates his own position regarding
the appreciation of nature as two different kinds of formalism. [4] In light of the basic position types introduced above, the
classic formalism Newman considers may be characterized with reference
to formal properties (FP) and art objects (AO) in either a basic or
a normative fashion:
4. BASIC FORMALISM: AK to
FP iff AA of AO.
5. NORMATIVE FORMALISM: AK
to FP iff AAA of AO.
The differences between these
two characterizations of formalism are not significant here; what is
significant is that both make attention to formal properties both necessary
and sufficient. However, a weaker and, in my opinion, more plausible
normative formalism involves only necessity:
6. WEAK NORMATIVE FORMALISM:
AK to FP if AAA of AO.
Weak normative formalism is the kind of view
Newman appears to defend in the first part of this essay, although his
position concerns natural objects and environments (NO) rather than
art objects. He contends that "our active engagement with our natural
surroundings has no alternative but to accommodate" as part of
a "required" response, the formal properties of "distant
panoramas," such as "rhythmical patterns of shapes, color
segments and spatial relations." However, he also notes: "in
the spirit of the refined formalism I am proposing, such formal
elements comprise only one aspect of our interest." [5] Thus, his position in the first part of his essay may be characterized
as follows:
7. REFINED FORMALISM: AK to
FP if AAA of NO.
In the second part of his essay, Newman develops
another kind of formalist position. He contends that "the human-derived
meanings of natural phenomena must be given the recognition they are
due" and thus that:
...in dealing with nature appreciation, formalism will be joined with
other approaches, including the symbolic, psychological and moral responses
to the patterns present in natural phenomena. In fact, we might even
call it an iconographic formalism, under whose framework the
soaring arcs, shattering waves, radiant sunrises and flowing botanical
rhythms can be understood and appreciated for their exemplificative
and expressive meanings, and not just their abstract and bare
forms.[6]
Newman holds that attention
to such expressive properties (EP) is a necessary part of our appropriate
aesthetic appreciation of nature lest "we disregard who we
are as human subjects," but he also cautions that: "Nature
is not always...'our creation'; nature merely sometimes is, and only
in some ways or aspects." [7] Thus, his position in the second part of his essay may be characterized
as follows:
8. ICONOGRAPHIC FORMALISM:
AK to FP and EP if AAA of some NO.
I comment on Newman's formalism below, but
first I return to Heyd and clearly state his point of view on the aesthetic
appreciation of nature. Heyd develops his position by contrasting it
with my own. Thus it is useful to initially clearly state my position.
Heyd glosses it as follows:
Carlson justifies the appeal to natural science as the guide to 'correct'
or 'appropriate' appreciation of the natural environment, on the basis
that this discipline supposedly reveals nature for what it is....The
contrast is with appreciation guided by cultural or personal
categories.[8]
As Heyd notes, my position
involves the idea that natural science reveals the natural properties
(NP) that natural objects have and thus that attention to at least some
of such properties is necessary for correct or appropriate aesthetic
appreciation of natural environments. The view may be called cognitive
naturalism and characterized as a position of the weak normative type:
9. COGNITIVE NATURALISM: AK to some NP if AAA
of NO.
The contrast between cognitive naturalism and
Heyd's own position is evident in the above quote in his suggestion
that appreciation of the natural environment may be "guided by
cultural or personal categories." He makes his point
more explicit in the following remark:
It may well be that all sorts of other perspectives, garnered
through one's personal intercourse with nature and structured by non-scientific
aspects on one's culture may be more "fruitful" in generating
aesthetic pleasure, insight or depth.[9]
Although Heyd refers to "all
sorts of other perspectives," it is clear that what figures most
prominently in his thinking is the idea that "fruitful" appreciation
of nature may be "guided by" attention to the cultural properties
(CP) that at least some natural objects have acquired by human "intercourse
with nature." [10] I call positions of the kind that Heyd defends cognitive culturalism
and, although Heyd's version of it may in fact be weaker than theories
of the weak normative type, it may be characterized as such for present
purposes:
10. COGNITIVE CULTURALISM:
AK to CP if AAA of some NO.
Having now clarified Newman's, Heyd's, and
my own position concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature, a number
of significant points can be made. The first is that, in light of these
formulations of the different points of view, it should be evident that
there is no conflict among the various positions. Newman's refined formalism
and iconographic formalism, my cognitive naturalism, and Heyd's cognitive
culturalism (lines 7, 8, 9, and 10 above) can all be true. Each gives
only necessary conditions for the appropriate aesthetic appreciation
of nature; none claims sufficiency. Indeed part of my motivation in
clarifying these positions as I have is to bring out this fact. It is
important because much of the apparent plausibility of Newman's and
Heyd's criticisms of cognitive naturalism depends upon their presentations
of alternative accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of nature. However,
once it is clear that these accounts are "alternative" only
in the sense of being different in emphasis from cognitive naturalism
and not in the sense of being in direct conflict with it, much of the
apparent plausibility of these criticisms dissipates.
Nonetheless, it must be noted that both Newman
and Heyd do offer criticisms that are to some extent independent of
their alternative accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of nature.
However, Newman's criticisms, as noted above, are directed mainly against
my treatment of formalism and not against cognitive naturalism as such.
In fact at points he suggests that cognitive naturalism and iconographic
formalism compliment one another. For example:
...what I am proposing is a dual-aspect view
toward nature, where...the biological and geological dimensions
of natural phenomena (as Carlson and Leopold indicate) are considered
essential. [and] At the same time...human-derived meanings of natural
phenomena must be given the recognition they are due. [11]
Moreover, concerning his criticisms
of my treatment of formalism, his remarks are insightful, suggesting
that in so far as my critique is taken as being directed against weak
normative versions of formalism such as his (lines 7 and 8 above) rather
than only against the application of stronger classical forms of formalism
(lines 4 and 5 above) to natural environments, it may be too harsh.
On the other hand, Heyd does present some arguments
that are both independent of his cognitive culturalism position and
directed squarely at cognitive naturalism. He is particularly worried
about the role that natural science plays in cognitive naturalism. For
example, he questions the point of "requiring that we see our natural
environment through the dicta of natural scientific theory"
noting, first, the "incomplete and always provisional
character of the 'truths' of science" and, second, the fact "that
our natural science itself is part of a culture and not a (visionary?)
grasp of the ultimate being of the world." [12] Concerns of this nature can be addressed as
follows: The point of appreciating the natural environment in light
of natural science is simply that science, although certainly not a
"visionary grasp" of "ultimate being," is yet without
doubt the best means we have come up with so far for knowing the
"true" nature of the world. Moreover, this is clearly
the case even though science is, of course, a part of our culture and
its truths are, of course, provisional and incomplete. This said, however,
it must also be noted that these matters are not quite as straightforward
as this answer suggests. Nonetheless, it is, I think, basically the
right kind of response to concerns such as those expressed by Heyd--and
enough of a response here, since this general issue is much discussed
elsewhere. [13]
Returning now to the fact that, in light of
my clarifications of Newman's and Heyd's positions and of cognitive
naturalism, there is no conflict among these theories, four further
points can be made: First, since there is no direct conflict among
these theories, the issue is not which is right and which wrong, but
rather the extent to which they supplement one another and are each
in themselves applicable and plausible accounts of appropriate aesthetic
appreciation of nature. Second, concerning Newman's and Heyd's positions,
in addition to there being no conflict between them, it appears that
much of the former is subsumable under the latter. Since expressive
properties constitute one kind of cultural property, Newman's iconographic
formalism appears to be a species of cognitive culturalism. [14] This means that the applicability and the plausibility of iconographic
formalism and cognitive culturalism can be investigated together. Third,
since both iconographic formalism and cognitive culturalism, unlike
cognitive naturalism, are claimed to hold for only some natural objects,
there is a sense in which the applicability and the plausibility of
both theories, in contrast to that of cognitive naturalism, can be investigated
only on a case by case basis. Fourth, given points two and three, the
applicability and the plausibility of cognitive culturalism (and thus
iconographic formalism), as opposed to that of cognitive naturalism,
may be tested by considering cases of different natural objects and
inquiring of each about the extent to which it has cultural properties.
In short, Newman's and Heyd's theories provide an applicable and plausible
account of the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, and thus
supplement the account given by cognitive naturalism, to the extent
that and only to the extent that a given natural object has acquired
cultural properties.
In light of these four points, I conclude by
investigating some cases of natural objects and environments that I
think demonstrate both the applicability and the plausibility of Newman's
and Heyd's accounts of aesthetic appreciation of nature and the extent
to which these accounts supplement that given by cognitive naturalism.
I consider a spectrum of cases that range from natural objects and environments
that clearly have cultural properties, and thus to which and for which
these accounts are both applicable and plausible, to other cases concerning
which these matters are less obvious. One point of the investigation,
in addition to testing the applicability and the plausibility of views
of the cognitive culturalism type and thus determining the extent to
which such views supplement cognitive naturalism, is to consider the
nature and the extent of cultural properties of natural objects and
environments. Another point is to suggest that, concerning those natural
objects and environments that have few if any cultural properties, cognitive
naturalism seemingly remains the most applicable and plausible theory
of the aesthetic appreciation of nature.
Case 1: The Human-modified Landscape: The most obvious kinds of natural
objects and environments that have acquired cultural properties are
those that have been intentionally modified by human physical activity.
These kinds of cases in fact constitute most of the environments in
which humans live. They range from vast tracts of land, such as the
agricultural landscapes of the world, to smaller scale natural objects,
such as Mount Rushmore, that have been modified to serve particular
human ends. These cases stand at the limits of environments and objects
that we might consider natural, but nonetheless clearly lend themselves
to the kind of account given by cognitive culturalism. I do not discuss
such cases in detail here, as I have done so elsewhere.[15]
Case 2: The Burmis Tree: Similar kinds of cases
involve natural objects and environments that have likewise acquired
cultural properties due to human physical activity but in less direct
and/or in less obvious ways. Here examples range from "natural"
sunsets the colours of which are wonderfully enhanced by air pollution
to particular objects such as the Burmis Tree. The Burmis Tree is an
ancient, gnarled pine standing on a hill side near the town of Burmis
and along the route to the Crowsnest Pass in southwestern Alberta. It
was a landmark for miners heading for the coal mines of the southern
Canadian Rockies at the beginning of the last century and remains so
for motorists travelling highway 3 across the pass from Alberta to British
Columbia. Today the tree is dead and especially striking when seen in
stark silhouette standing tall and dark against the snow covered peaks
of the nearby mountains. The cultural properties of the Burmis tree
are numerous. For example, one of the local says: "The tree is
a symbol for the hardy old-timers who once mined coal from the bellies
of the rugged mountains." She likens it to the miners wives who
"started out young and soft and pretty" but who with age and
hard times became "more beautiful in a sense, but more hardened." [16] Moreover, such symbolic and expressive properties
of the tree are modified and augmented by the fact that its death was
due to a local school science class giving it too much fertilizer in
1978 and the fact that its stark tall-standing silhouette is due to
its having been propped up and held erect by metal clamps and cables
bolted to the rock on which it stands. The tree thus has a complex set
of various kinds of cultural properties, knowledge of which is central
to it appropriate aesthetic appreciation. Cognitive naturalism alone
obviously cannot do justice to such cases; cognitive culturalism is
essential.
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Case 5: Wilderness: Beyond human modification and human
use of natural objects and environments and perhaps even beyond human
mythology and, as Newman nicely puts it, the human capacity "to
construct an environment of meaningful (or iconographic) symbols"
lies what we think of as pristine wilderness. [20] Denali National Park and Wildlife Preserve is larger than Massachusetts.
Its six million acres straddle the 600 mile long Alaska Range that cuts
across the interior of Alaska and is crowned by Mount McKinley, North
America's highest peak. It is described as "a true wilderness,"
"largely wild and unspoiled," and "still little changed"
by humanity. [21] And indeed it has the appearance of a true wilderness: the
vast landscape is marked by a single gravel road along which visitors
travel only in park buses, safari style, viewing caribou, wolf, moose,
grizzly bear, and Dall sheep, all so oblivious to human presence that
it must be as it was in Eden. Here, it seems, only the account given
by cognitive naturalism is applicable and plausible. Yet some cultural
properties sneak in even here. It is six million acres, but it is yet
a park, a human creation with a human-ordained beginning and human-determined
boundaries. Moreover, Denali has a history that intertwines it and its
inhabitants with human culture. It was established in 1917 primarily
to prevent the slaughter of Dall sheep by meat hunters who were feeding
workers on the railroad that was destined to bring gold from the interior
fields to the southern port of Seward. Denali's Dall sheep, now so oblivious
to human presence, are the descendants of a tiny remnant rescued from
the brink of extinction. And present-day human culture also finds niches
in the park. When I visited Denali, our safari group spotted a lone
moose crossing a pristine mountain stream far out on the trackless taiga.
As we aesthetically appreciated this unspoiled natural wonder through
our binoculars, someone in the group said, "What's wrong with its
neck?," and our guide, who had the strongest glasses, replied,
"Oh, that's just a research radio collar." Science is a part
of our culture, as Heyd notes, and the way in which it can affect our
aesthetic appreciation is not only as science revealing truths about
nature, but also as human culture at work in nature.
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